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Thr ee Bar r ier s to VSED by Advance Dir ective: A
Cr itical Assessment
Paul T. Menzel, PhD*
ABSTRACT
Competent persons have the right to voluntarily stop eating and drinking
as a means of hastening death, just as they have the right to refuse lifesaving
medical treatment. If people do not lose their rights merely by becoming
incompetent, then arguably their right to stop eating and drinking is not lost
when they become incompetent. Such a right could be exercised on their
behalf pursuant to an advance directive.
However, such directives to withhold food and fluids by mouth face
significant legal and moral barriers. Among them are that consent is no
defense to a charge of criminal homicide for failure to feed, that an
incompetent person’s willingness to eat constitutes a change of mind
revoking her directive, and that oral feeding is basic personal care that falls
outside the legitimate scope of advance directives. None of these three
objections is persuasive. Strong reasons for rejecting them bolster the case
for permitting the implementation of adequately clear directives to withhold
food and fluids by mouth.

I. INTRODUCTION
Voluntarily stopping eating and drinking (VSED) is one way in which
people afflicted with painful or debilitating conditions can hasten their
deaths. When paced and managed with the appropriate palliative care, dying
by VSED is usually a relatively peaceful and comfortable death.1 It is
*

Professor of Philosophy emeritus, Pacific Lutheran University, menzelpt@plu.edu.
Ira Byock, Patient Refusal of Nutrition and Hydration: Walking the Ever-Finer Line,
12 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE 8, 8-13 (1995); Judith K. Schwarz, Hospice
Care for Patients Who Choose to Hasten Death by Voluntarily Stopping Eating and
1
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attractive to patients for that and various other reasons, including the fact
that, unlike the refusal of lifesaving treatment, VSED expedites death even
when no lifesaving care is needed that could be refused.2 As an option for
hastening death, VSED also ensures that death will come within a few
weeks.
An elegant, logical sequence forms the initial argument for the use of
advance directives (ADs) to exercise VSED in situations where the patient
is not competent. In what I will refer to as “the basic argument,” two legal
and moral realities, one about VSED and the other about ADs, create a third
claim:
1. Competent persons have a right to VSED.3
2. Competent persons can also write ADs for future situations when they
will lack decision-making capacity, including instructions to refuse
lifesaving medical treatment.4 If those directives are clear and
Drinking, 16 J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE NURSING 126, 126-31 (2014); Paula Span,
The VSED Exit: A Way to Speed Up Dying, Without Asking Permission, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2016, at D5. Numerous other sources are provided in Paul T. Menzel & M. Colette
Chandler-Cramer, Advance Directives, Dementia, and Withholding Food and Water by
Mouth, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 23, 23-37 n.14-22 (2014).
2
Span, supra note 1; Paul T. Menzel, Merits, Demands, and Challenges of VSED, 6
NARRATIVE INQUIRY BIOETHICS 120, 121-26 (2016).
3
Concerning the legal right, see generally Thaddeus M. Pope & Lisa E. Anderson,
Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking: A Legal Treatment Option at the End of Life,
17 WIDENER L. REV. 363 (2011); Norman L. Cantor, Honing the Emerging Right to Stop
Eating and Drinking, BILL OF HEALTH (Nov. 18, 2016),
http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2016/11/18/patients-right-to-stop-eating-anddrinking/, hereinafter referred to as Cantor, BILL OF HEALTH (2016). (I add to this
claim that VSED is a legal right that people have a moral right to VSED as well, in the
sense of a “moral liberty”—others are doing something morally wrong if they forcibly
interfere with a person’s pursuit of VSED.)
4
The development of the legal view that a person’s common law and constitutional
liberty based right to control medical choices does not vanish upon incompetence was led
by state courts in the 1980s and 1990s. See Norman R. Cantor, Can the Right to Stop
Eating and Drinking be Exercised via a Surrogate Acting Pursuant to an Advance
Instruction? BILL OF HEALTH (Jan. 23, 2017),
http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2017/01/23/can-the-right-to-sed-be-exercised-via-asurrogate-acting-pursuant-to-an-advance-instruction/#more-20582 (blogsite of PetrieFlom Center, Harvard Law School), hereinafter referred to as Cantor, BILL OF
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substantive enough for later decision-makers to know when to apply
them, they have considerable normative weight, exemplifying the
underlying principle that a person’s basic rights are not lost with
incompetence.
It would then seem to follow:
3. By sufficiently clear ADs, people should be able to have food and
fluids as well as lifesaving medical treatment withheld.
I will refer to the directives that emerge from this basic argument as
“ADs for Stopping Eating and Drinking” (“ADs for SED”) and what
happens when they are implemented as “Stopping Eating and Drinking by
ADs” (“SED by AD”). If such directives can be implemented, one’s control
over the end of life will be significantly enhanced. Short of preemptive
suicide or stopping eating and drinking when one is still competent and
decisive, ADs for SED are arguably the only way of ensuring, for example,
that one will not live into long years of severe dementia. Some find such a
fate at least as objectionable as the weeks and months of suffering that they
can avoid by aid-in-dying or refusing lifesaving treatment.5 To them, ADs
for SED provide a vital end-of-life option.
HEALTH (2017). Influential cases in the development of common law about advance
directives include In re Browning, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990) and In re Jobes, 529 A.2d
434, 451 (N.J. 1987). See also the comprehensive book-length treatment by NORMAN R.
CANTOR, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE PURSUIT OF DEATH WITH DIGNITY (1990).
5
The author knows of no studies directly of the prevalence of this view in a population.
However, many individual cases have been described in the literature, including (1)
Margot Bentley, see Katherine Hammond, Kept Alive – The Enduring Tragedy of Margot
Bentley, 6 NARRATIVE INQUIRY BIOETHICS 80, 80-82 (2016) (the legal cases involving
Mrs. Bentley are infra note 7); (2) Alan Alberts, see Phyllis Shacter, Not Here by Choice:
My Husband’s Choice About How and When to Die, 6 NARRATIVE INQUIRY BIOETHICS
94, 94-96 (2016); (3) Jeptha Carrell, see Paul T. Menzel, Carpe Diem: the Death of
Jeptha Carrell (2010),
https://docs.google.com/a/plu.edu/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=cGx1LmVkdXxtZW56
ZWxwdHxneDphM2FmY2FlMWMwMzIwOGY (also available at
https://sites.google.com/a/plu.edu/menzelpt/selected-unpublished-documents). An
intensive study by Volicer and Stets, while not a population study, is also revealing.
Volicer & Stets, infra note 39 (from two focus groups of relatives of persons who had
died with dementia, the authors found generally positive attitudes toward using advance
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Since the basic legal elements that generate such directives—the first two
propositions in the basic argument above, the right of competent persons to
VSED and the principle that people do not lose their rights when they
become incompetent—already exist by common law, not statutory law,
ADs for SED would also arguably be legal without legislative
authorization.6 Moreover, since the initial right to VSED is not limited to
situations of terminal illness, SED by AD would also not be limited to such
situations.
As a matter of propositional logic, the inference in the basic argument to
the legitimacy of ADs for SED may be sound, but as a matter of moral and
legal reasoning, it is simplistic. Various legal, moral, and clinical
considerations intrude. This paper will address three legal and ethical
objections that constitute barriers to implementing ADs for SED.
A. Consent Is No Defense to Criminal Homicide
A valid directive has to be implemented by someone. Nursing home staff,
for example, will have to stop providing food and fluids by mouth. But if
failing to provide such a basic need can constitute culpable homicide, and
the victim’s consent is legally no defense to a homicide, then a person’s
consent that is carried forward to the time of incompetence by an AD will
not provide a defense for anyone who implements a directive.
B. Willingness to Eat Is a Change of Mind
In a later state of incompetence like severe dementia, a person with an
AD for SED may still accept food and fluids by mouth. Does such
acceptance constitute a change of mind about the directive, effectively
revoking it? If it does, it removes the directive’s normative force.7 Even if
directives to refuse various forms of life-sustaining care, including oral feeding, implying
a preference that life not extend into years of severe dementia).
6
See Cantor, BILL HEALTH (2017), supra note 4, at 2 and accompanying cases.
7
This was one of several key issues in Bentley v. Maplewood Seniors Care Society,
2015 BCCA 91 (Mar. 5th, 2015) (on appeal of Bentley v. Maplewood Seniors Care
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acceptance of food is not the kind of change of mind that revokes a
directive, it still may constitute the patient’s consent and will, which
caregivers would be obliged to respect.
C. Food and Fluids Is Basic Personal Care
Providing food and fluids arguably constitutes basic personal care, not
medical treatment. Even if acceptance of food and fluids does not constitute
adequate consent or the change of mind that revokes an AD, food and fluids
are different than medical treatment. As basic personal care, provision of
food and fluids by mouth is not properly amenable to control by AD.8
Caregivers’ obligations to provide basic personal care are not restricted by
ADs in the same way their obligations to provide medical care are
restricted.
While each of these objections is cogent, I will argue that morally and
legally none constitutes a persuasive reason for refusing to implement an
AD for SED. As we shall see, the first objection disintegrates upon analysis
of when not providing a basic need is culpable homicide. The second
objection can be correct—sometimes physically accepting food and fluids
does constitute a relevant change of mind, but in many situations the mere
acceptance of food will not. The third objection fails once we examine the
fundamental reasons that ADs have normative force.

Society 2014 BCSC 165 (Feb. 3, 2014)). The Court of Appeal, as had the B.C. Supreme
Court, decided that Ms. Bentley’s acceptance of certain foods by opening her mouth and
swallowing constituted the relevant consent to eat. For a longer elaboration of a wider
array of change-of-mind issues for ADs, see Paul T. Menzel, Change of Mind: An Issue
for Advance Directives, in ETHICS AT THE END OF LIFE: NEW ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS
126-37 (John K. Davis ed., 2017).
8
On this issue too, the 2014 Bentley court came out against implementing Mrs.
Bentley’s prior wishes. Bentley, 2014 BCSC at paras. 62-84, 153.
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II. MORAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
My ethical-legal analysis of each of these three objections will discern
the moral underpinnings of the law and what the law should be. I will not
rely heavily on judicial decisions, although I will engage various arguments
and principles highlighted in some decisions and in the legal literature.
Even if I am correct that the reasoning behind these three objections to ADs
for SED is weak, one can therefore not conclude from my argument that
implementing such directives is actually legally permissible. My analysis is
most convincing as a moral argument against these three barriers, and as the
legal reasoning that can be brought to bear against them. Actual judicial
rulings may not follow this reasoning if and when an appropriate case
comes to trial. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the legal force of ADs may
be contingent on legislation and therefore relatively immune to my
argument.9
My assessment is thus best taken as an argument that none of these three
objections should stand as a barrier to using ADs for withholding food and
fluids by mouth. Such an argument can contribute to the larger societal
process of determining whether such directives should have normative force
in clinical decisions.
A. Consent Is No Defense to Criminal Homicide
In the criminal law generally, victim consent provides no defense for a
crime’s perpetrator. Against a charge of murder, for example, the victim’s
consent to be killed provides no defense. At most, consent may justify

9

Also relevant to the predictive legality of implementing an AD for SED may be the
distinction between criminal and civil cases. The legal risk for a surrogate decision maker
or health care provider would likely be less in the context of a civil case for guardianship,
which could be brought before the withholding of food and fluids, than in a criminal case
brought after withholding had already been started or completed. Perhaps the law could
be tested in a civil context without someone taking the risk of becoming a criminal law
martyr. E-mail correspondence with Terry J. Barnett, JD, of Tacoma, WA (Jan. 26, 2015)
(e-mail on file with author).
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reducing the wrong that society sees in the killing to a lesser degree of
criminal homicide.10
In the current context of SED by AD, a proxy decision maker and
caregiver do not provide food and feeding assistance to the person who
lacks the capacity to obtain food and feed himself. Not providing the food
would constitute “starving” the person, causing his death, and the person
deemed responsible could then be charged with criminal homicide. If the
defendant claims that the person’s AD constitutes his consent to not being
fed, that claim may be accepted but the acknowledged consent will provide
no legal remedy for the defendant.
The analysis in the previous paragraph, however, is incomplete and
misleading. A “passive act” or omission, like the failure to feed, can
appropriately lead to a charge of criminal homicide, but this is only the case
when the caregiver/decisionmaker is seen to have a duty to do what she did
not do (here, to feed). One does not even reach the question of whether
consent can provide a defense if there is no duty to feed that can ground a
charge of homicide. But the precise question at issue when a person has an
AD for SED is whether, in that circumstance, caregivers do have a duty to
feed. Whether the AD releases caregivers from their normal duty to feed has
to be determined before we know whether a charge of criminal homicide is
appropriate.
If, on the one hand, the AD does release caregivers from their normal
duty, then there is no duty to feed, there can be no charge of homicide, and
the question of what defenses are available does not arise. The consent that
resides in a patient’s directive is not asked to do its normative work by
providing the defendant with a defense; it does its work at a logically prior

10

John Kleinig & North Ryde, Consent as a Defence in Criminal Law, 65 ARCHIVES
329, 330 (1979). The legal maxim volenti non fit injuria—to
the one who consents, no wrong is done—is longstanding in the criminal law but has
many equally established exceptions: murder, castration, and dueling, among them.
Sayings have formed for some of the exceptions, e.g., “consent is no defense to murder.”

FOR PHIL. L. & SOC. PHIL.
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point by determining whether there is a duty to feed, a requisite element if
failure to feed is homicide. If, on the other hand, providers and proxies still
have a duty to feed despite a person’s directive, then homicide may indeed
be an appropriate charge, but the consent residing in the AD has already
been determined impotent. It cannot come back into play to provide a
criminal defense; it has already failed to alter caregivers’ normal duty to
provide food and fluids.
Indeed, the consent of the person who wrote the AD provides no defense
against a charge of criminal homicide, but the normative work that the
consent present in a person’s AD may play is located elsewhere—in the
logically prior question of whether caregivers have a duty to feed.
This analysis of why “consent is no defense” does not settle the primary
substantive question of whether SED by AD is permissible. The analysis is
only a point within the internal logic of homicide charges for a failure to
perform an obligatory act. The primary question remains whether
caregivers’ normal duties to feed are still in fact duties when the person has
a clear AD for SED.
B. Willingness to Eat Is a Change of Mind11
Assume that ADs have normative power to preserve patient choice that
ought to be respected. Assume also that a person has a directive to withhold
food and fluids by mouth, especially assistance with eating and drinking,
and that the AD is both valid and applicable—valid because it was not
coerced and was adequately informed, and applicable because the patient
now lacks mental capacity, the directive was clear about the future
conditions in which food and fluids is to be withheld, and those conditions
now obtain. As is quite common in severe cognitive decline, however, the
11

See Menzel, supra note 7. In the current paper, I apply to eating behavior specifically
the general framework worked out in the previous paper for determining whether
something new in a person’s desires, beliefs, or values constitutes a relevant change of
mind that should be seen as revoking a directive.
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person may still willingly eat when offered food. Does such willingness
constitute a change of mind that revokes the directive?
Relevant change of mind by a patient that would revoke a directive has a
critical role in the moral and legal architecture of directives. It is always
important to be on the lookout for any change of mind if we are to be
justifiably confident that a directive really does still represent the expressed
will of the patient when it is implemented. The same concern that the
document still represents the will of the patient is reflected in our
presumption that a directive’s authority is stronger the more recently it was
written or reiterated.12 Above all, a subsequent valid directive replaces any
element that it conflicts with in an earlier directive.
Despite the importance of change of mind, such situations are improbable
in cases of chronic cognitive impairment. The very state of diminished
capacity for which an AD is written makes it unlikely that, as the time for
the directive’s implementation approaches, its author is capable of changing
it. As Ron Berghmans states, in the case of dementia the irony is that “at the
time you would most likely ‘change your mind,’ you do not have enough
mind left to change.”13 Many will then conclude that in most typical cases, a
12
In our moral and legal culture, we do not carry this concern that people might have
changed their mind without bothering to express it to an extreme. If we did, we would
dispense with ADs altogether, along these lines: “It is always possible that someone
changed her mind. Now, precisely because she is incompetent and unable to express
herself, we do not know that she has not changed her mind. Therefore, without knowing
that a person has not changed her mind, we can never regard a directive as having
authority once the time of incompetence to which it was meant to apply has arrived. So
ADs are out of order generally.” I owe recognition of this substantive line of thinking
(not the precise words used here) to Lawrence Nelson of Santa Clara University.
The general acceptance of ADs in the last half century implies that we reject this line of
argument. Hidden change of mind is always possible, but its mere possibility is no reason
to discount directives. According ADs any authority at all does run some risk that
unbeknownst to us, the person has had a change of mind. According directives no
authority, however, runs a much greater risk of not respecting patient choice. We
generally think that for change of mind to justify not following a directive, there must be
evidence it has actually occurred.
13
Ron L.P. Berghmans, Advance Directives and Dementia, 913 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
SCI. 105, 106 (2000).
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change of mind about one’s directive is no longer possible. No matter how
much the person is now willing to eat, for example, she does not have the
cognitive capacity to revise or revoke a directive.
This, however, excessively narrows what qualifies as a relevant change
of mind. Even if the person is well past the time when she still has capacity
to revise the directive, if certain attitudes and desires change that were
significant reasons for the person’s choice to write her directive the way she
did, then a relevant change of mind can still occur. To see this, imagine two
versions of the directive of a person I shall refer to as Andrew,14 and then
consider a third, real case, Margot Bentley.
1. Andr ew
Andrew’s directive says that he is to receive no life-extending care,
including food and fluids by mouth, when he is irreversibly in a cognitive
state where he no longer recognizes his closest friends and loved ones. Now
he is in that state. He amply conveyed to his family his reasons for writing
this kind of directive, and he stated some of them in the AD itself: that life
without the capacity for such recognition is not the kind he has always lived
for and encouraged others to appreciate, that he prefers resources to go to
things he cares about much more strongly than he cares about having his
life extend into such a condition, and that he wants loved ones not to have
to care for him for years on end with little if any communication back from
him, with the likely result that they will remember him less clearly and
fondly. (This reasoning will change in the ensuing “Andrew Revised” case.)
Now Andrew is in need of the feeding assistance, assistance he said in his
directive he wanted withheld, and he apparently wants to be fed. He will
accept careful spoon feeding, especially of certain foods he apparently likes
more than others. Occasionally, if he smells food nearby that is not offered
14
These two versions of Andrew parallel the contrasts between “Richard” and “Revised
Richard” and between “Margo” and “Complex Margo” pursued at length in Menzel,
supra note 7.
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to him, he will look at it and make soft sounds. Yet not only is he incapable
of rewriting his directive to say that feeding assistance should not be
withheld, but he no longer has the mental capacity to change the attitudes
about vitality in life, judicious use of resources, and others’ memories of
him after he dies that were the important reasons for his directive. In fact, it
is doubtful that he can now hold attitudes of any sort about those things. He
has never changed the values and attitudes that led him to write his
directive, and now, he can no longer change them.
2. Andr ew Revised
Contrast this with a similar Andrew with a slightly but crucially different
directive. His directive stipulates withholding the very same things as in his
directive stated previously, and under the same circumstances. Andrew
Revised’s reasoning, though, is different. Both orally and briefly in his
written directive, he expressed his view that life without being able to
recognize anyone was a condition he could not enjoy. His belief and attitude
in this respect was not irrational, for he was a very social person. Contrary
to what he anticipated, however, he now seems to experience some
enjoyment in a non-recognizing life. He is not distressed, he smiles often,
and he usually responds with a few isolated words or positive sounds when
someone looks him in the eye and gently strokes his arm.
Andrew Revised has reversed some of his previous attitudes that were
major reasons for writing his AD—this is important. The fundamental
rationale for looking to a person’s AD when he is no longer competent, no
longer remembers having an AD, and no longer cares about the personal
autonomy that a directive is intended to preserve, is that the values and
attitudes that were important enough to him to write an AD are still thought
of as his. However, sometimes those attitudes, not just his mental
competence, change. Why should we demand the fuller capacity to change
the directive itself in order to see the person’s altered state of mind as
effectively revoking his directive? Respect for persons involves, if anything,
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appreciating the fact that people have their own reasons for their decisions.
But then, if some of the attitudes that were important reasons for a person to
write an AD do in fact change, we can hardly still claim that we must
follow the directive in order to respect the person. Andrew Revised is an
example: we respect him more by interpreting his directive in light of new
developments directly related to his reasoning in writing his directive than if
we implement the directive as it was written.
Thus, the fact that a person is past the point where he or she can revise a
directive does not close the door to a relevant change of mind. Changes in
attitudes that were among the very reasons the person had for writing the
directive may still be possible. If they occur, they effectively revise the
directive. Let us apply this now to the most important case, an actual one.
3. The Bentley Case
Margot Bentley, an 85-year-old former nurse, was diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s 17 years before she died in November 2016. Mrs. Bentley
lived her last 12 years in a residential care facility, the last four with the
most severe Alzheimer’s. She did not recognize or respond to any of her
friends or family, did not speak, and could make only very limited
movements. She spent her days motionless in bed or slumped in a
wheelchair with her eyes closed and required spoon feeding. She would
usually open her mouth when food was held to it, though that varied, and
sometimes caregivers had to offer it several times. She accepted different
types and amounts of food on different days, seeming to prefer certain
flavors, and she would stop opening her mouth when she apparently felt
full.15
15
The facts about Mrs. Bentley in this paragraph are compiled from the descriptions in
Bentley v. Maplewood Seniors Care Society, 2015 BCCA 91 at paras. 1-3 (Mar. 5th,
2015); Bentley v. Maplewood Seniors Care Society, 2014 BCSC 165 at paras. 18-20, 2324 (Feb. 3, 2014); Hammond, supra note 5. Her death on November 9, 2016, was
reported in Pamela Fayerman, Margot Bentley Dies, A Finality that Couldn’t Come Too
Soon for Anguished Family, VANCOUVER SUN (Nov. 11, 2016),
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Mrs. Bentley first executed a directive in 1991, requesting that “If . . .
there is ‘no reasonable expectation of my recovery from extreme physical or
mental disability,’ she be ‘allowed to die and not be kept alive by artificial
means or heroic measures.’”16 She listed specific instructions, including “no
nourishment or liquids,” and designated her husband and daughter as proxy
decision makers.17 In 2000, shortly after the diagnosis of her Alzheimer’s
and consistent with her earlier directive, she “repeatedly told her family that
she wished to be allowed to die when she reached a stage of advanced
dementia,” a stage she reached in 2012.18 Did Mrs. Bentley’s apparent
willingness to accept food even after she was in severe dementia constitute
a change of mind about what she requested in her directive?19

http://vancouversun.com/health/seniors/margot-bentley-dies-a-finality-that-couldntcome-too-soon-for-anguished-family.
16
Bentley, 2015 BCCA at para. 2 (the quotation is from the Court of Appeal decision,
describing Mrs. Bentley’s advance directive and in turn quoting it).
17
Bentley v. Maplewood Seniors Care Society, 2014 BCSC 165 at paras. 103-113;
Bentley, 2015 BCCA at para. 7. The representatives of the Fraser Health Authority and
both courts read these passages as Mrs. Bentley not clearly conveying that she to the end
wanted oral feeding to be stopped in the specified circumstances, but only medically
delivered nutrition and hydration. See also Thaddeus M. Pope & Amanda West, Legal
Briefing: Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking, 25 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 68, 68-80
(2014); Thaddeus M. Pope, Prospective Autonomy and Ulysses Contracts for VSED, one
of two sections of Thaddeus M. Pope & Bernadette J. Richards, Decision-Making: At the
End of Life and the Provision of Pretreatment Advice, 12 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 389,
391 (2015), hereinafter Pope, Decision-Making. As the court record and these two
articles note, various other particular considerations about Mrs. Bentley’s directive were
influential in the B.C. courts’ decisions not to see her directive as authoritative.
18
Pope, Decision-Making, supra note 17, at 389.
19
This is not precisely the question the British Columbia courts addressed. They
addressed whether Mrs. Bentley had the capacity to consent to eat and whether her
behavior of sometimes accepting food constituted that consent. They answered both
questions in the affirmative and then determined that her previous wishes could not
control. Bentley, 2014 BCSC at paras. 43-61, 153; Bentley, 2015 BCCA at paras. 11-16;
Pope, Decision-Making, supra note 17, at 390,391. The 2014 court also found that
providing food and fluids by mouth was “basic personal care,” not medical care, and, as
such, not within the purview of any AD. Bentley, 2014 BCSC at paras. 77-84. Other
nuances not noted here were also important to the two decisions.
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Especially with her experience as a nurse, Mrs. Bentley could be
presumed to be knowledgeable in writing her directive. The directive later
became clearly applicable: she had been in advanced dementia for several
years, one of the conditions explicitly stated in her directive for not being
given life-extending measures, including nourishment and liquids. During
this time, she selectively opened her mouth to accept food, appearing to
discriminate between foods she liked and those she did not, and between
eating when hungry and not when she felt full.
a) Consensual Behavior and Change of Mind
Did Mrs. Bentley’s discriminating acceptance of food constitute a
relevant change of mind about her directive?
We might first ask whether we should deem Mrs. Bentley’s
discriminating acceptance of food to be “consenting behavior” and not a
non-voluntary reflex.20 It may be reasonable to see her behavior as consent
to eat. The capacity required for any given consent is relative to what the
person is consenting to. For an elemental activity such as eating, the
cognitive capacity required for it to be a consenting behavior is minimal; it
is a basic, simple activity that the person has been doing his or her whole
life.
Concluding that the activity is consensual, though, does not settle the
question of whether it constitutes a change of mind that revokes the
person’s directive. For a relevant change of mind, Mrs. Bentley does not
20

Two different assessments ought to be distinguished, between making a choice about
eating and consenting to eat. The former is the more minimal claim. In the Bentley v.
Maplewood court record, some of the claims discussed are put in terms of “choice”; some
of the Fraser Health Authority’s staff, for example, argued that “by sometimes accepting
food and sometimes closing her mouth to keep the spoon from entering her mouth, Mrs.
Bentley did exercise some choice in the matter.” Bentley, 2014 BCSC 165 at paras. 3132, exhibit L (emphasis added). The conclusion of the court went further, into consent:
she showed “current consent,” she had capacity to consent to being fed, and she
continued to give her consent. Bentley, 2014 BCSC Id. at para. 54. For further detail and
analysis, see Pope and West, supra note 17, at 74-77.
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have to be capable of considering her directive, but if she is not capable of
that, her eating behavior would have to convey a new attitude toward
something that was part of her reasoning in writing her directive. It is
theoretically possible that her reason for stipulating no nourishment and
liquids upon becoming extremely disabled, physically or mentally, was that
she thought eating or drinking would be uncomfortable, but that is hardly
plausible. If that was her reason, why would she have stipulated all the other
interventions that she wanted to have withheld? The plausible reasons are
much more likely to have something to do with her beliefs that her whole
life should not conclude with years of advanced dementia, rather than any
anticipation that she would not be willing to eat. In her later years, Mrs.
Bentley was no longer capable of any change of mind in regard to those
reasons. Therefore, her acceptance of food, even if it did constitute consent
to eat, did not constitute a relevant change of mind. She never revoked her
directive.
Mrs. Bentley’s directive, therefore, was still valid, despite her willingness
to eat. Her willingness may well have constituted consenting to eat, and
when she ate, she may well have been making a choice. Yet, such consent
and choice did not constitute a relevant change of mind about her directive
unless they related to the substance of her reasons for writing it.
Nonetheless, one might still regard her willingness to eat as reason not to
implement her directive. It certainly pulls one toward feeding her despite
her directive. This pull may be justified, but for reasons quite different than
a change of mind. Even when ADs are fully intact, with no hint of
revocation, they can confront other problems that complicate their authority,
including the basic “then-self, now-self” problem.
b) The Then-Self vs. Now-Self Problem—Beyond Change of Mind
Despite the conclusion that consensual willingness to eat did not
constitute a change of mind for Mrs. Bentley, the most fundamental
problem afflicting advance directives still remains a challenge: the so-called
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“then-self, now-self” problem. In a nutshell, the problem is that the current
incompetent self is different than the self who wrote the directive.21 The
now-self doesn’t remember writing the AD, doesn’t care about autonomy,
and may not find unbearable the diminished condition into which the person
insisted he or she did not want his or her life to extend. So what gives the
then-self any prerogative to determine how the now-self is treated? Why not
ignore any AD and just treat the current patient according to his or her own
best interest?
Though this is a powerful objection to the relevance of ADs, it only
complicates rather than destroys their normative force. ADs tend to retain
normative weight because even the current self still has interests shaped by
the life that the person developed and the values he or she held through all
the years of competent deliberation and decision making. To say that one
should treat the current person only according to the interests that he or she
is now experiencing would be to treat the person as if he or she had never
been competent.22 Most people do not have to think about this possibility
very long to express a strong opinion: of course we do not want ourselves to
be treated as if we had never been competent! Even later, when we lose our
competence to make medical treatment decisions, a never-competent person
is not who we become, for at one time we were competent. Our identities,
our lives, extend over time. Our narrative identity does not end with
incompetence.
If that is the case, we have to include in what constitutes Mrs. Bentley’s
current best interest in her advanced dementia the overarching concerns she

21

An originating and formative statement of the problem is in Rebecca Dresser & John
S. Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 17
L. Med. & Health Care 234 (1989). A fuller discussion of the problem, of some important
literature about it, and of the most persuasive resolutions of it is provided in Menzel &
Chandler-Cramer,, supra note 1, at 27-29; Paul T. Menzel & Bonnie Steinbock, Advance
Directives, Dementia, and Physician-Assisted Death, 41 J. L., MED., & ETHICS 484, 488493 (2013).
22
Nancy Rhoden, The Limits of Legal Objectivity, 68 N.C. L. REV. 845, 860 (1990).
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had about the shape of her whole life, some of which she conveyed in her
directive. Moreover, with the severe dementia that is Mrs. Bentley’s
condition, one’s current subjective interest in survival is much lower than it
is for a less impaired person. With very little capacity for memory or
anticipation, surviving until tomorrow cannot mean much, and when we get
to tomorrow, our having survived from a yesterday that we do not
remember won’t mean much either.23 If that is the case, and if people’s
insistent self-identification as persons who have long lives of competence
before losing competence, then we cannot show adequate respect for them if
we count the minimal current subjective value of survival for a severely
demented person, like Mrs. Bentley, as outweighing the value of respecting
the person who has a whole life.
Thus, it is difficult to conclude that in her last half decade, Mrs. Bentley’s
overall interests were best served by continuing to provide the feeding
assistance that she objected to in her directive, even if the correct
interpretation of her later behavior was that she willingly ate, consented to
eat, and chose to eat. The seriousness of the now-self versus then-selfchallenge, however, does explain why it is not irrational for someone to feel
pulled to continue to feed her. Imagine that Mrs. Bentley were less
demented and could still anticipate her own survival and appreciatively
remember having survived. The balance of the conflicting factors between
her directive and her current experience and appreciation of life might then
justify saying “not yet” to implementing her directive.24 If that is the reason
we decide not to follow a person’s directive, it is not because we see her
willingness to eat as a change of mind revoking the directive. It is because

23
Two co-authors and I have termed this the “sliding scale” or “balancing” model for
discerning the subjective value of life for a person in dementia. See Menzel & Steinbock,
supra note 21, at 492-93; Menzel & Colette-Chandler, supra note 1, at 28.
24
Menzel & Steinbock, supra note 21, at 497; Menzel & Colette-Chandler, supra note 1,
at 34.
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we see the person’s overall best interest as at that point in time still
conflicting with the directive.
In summary, a change of mind that effectively revokes a directive does
not require decision-making capacity to write a revised directive; it can
occur with changes in attitudes that were among the reasons the person had
for writing the directive she did. Sometimes those changes occur in a person
with significant dementia. However, willingness to accept food in a case
like Mrs. Bentley’s does not constitute such change. It leaves intact the
normative force of the directive with the reasons she had for writing it, even
if other ethical complications inherent in ADs justify delaying its
implementation.25
C. Basic Per sonal Car e and the Range of Dir ectives’ Author ity
If we are generally going to reject ADs for SED, then it will have to be
for some reason other than that a person’s current willingness to eat
constitutes a change of mind about the directive, because in many cases,
such as Mrs. Bentley’s, it will not. Such another reason was found by the
British Columbia courts that ruled on Mrs. Bentley’s case: providing food
and fluids and assistance with eating and drinking is basic personal care
and not medical care, and refusing basic personal care falls outside the
legitimate scope of any person’s AD.26 The B.C. courts based this element
of their decision on a variety of factors, including statutes about directives

25

Whether courts will follow this reasoning and make rulings about actual legal
permission consonant with it is an open question. See infra Part III.
26
Bentley v. Maplewood Seniors Care Society, 2014 BCSC 165 at paras. 62-84, 153
(Feb. 3, 2014). The 2015 B.C. Court of Appeals decision did not specifically address the
personal care matter because this aspect of the 2014 B.C. Supreme Court’s decision was
not one of the grounds for the plaintiffs’ appeal. Bentley v. Maplewood Seniors Care
Society, 2015 BCCA 91 at para. 10 (Mar. 5th, 2015). Since it did not overturn the 2014
British Columbia Supreme Court’s reasoning about basic personal care, Id., however, I
speak of both courts as having the view that the personal care character of oral feeding is
relevant to its proper place in advance directives.
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and agency guidelines about abuse.27 Beyond these two courts’ particular
reasons for invoking the distinction between medical treatment and basic
personal care, the essential argument can be expressed by focusing on the
orientation of caregivers: it is their duty to provide basic personal care,
which will always include oral feeding when it is not distressing or
medically complicating.28
One might, of course, contest the premise that oral feeding is basic
personal care. In many patient circumstances, caregivers have to be
experienced if they are to effectively feed a person. In such cases, oral
feeding is essentially professional care. Why is it not therefore “health
care,” even if we hesitate to call it “medical care”? I note these reasons for
claiming that oral feeding should be classified as health care, not basic
personal care, but I will not employ them in developing my argument. I will
assume that oral feeding is basic personal care, but then ask, why should we
think that the usual normative force of a person’s AD dissipates when it
addresses basic personal care, and why should those who provide personal
care be insulated from a person’s directive any more than those who
provide health care?
To answer these questions, one first needs to discern the fundamental
reasons ADs have moral weight regarding medical treatment. Then one can
assess the extent to which those reasons apply to basic personal care. The
closest comparison to withholding oral feeding will be provided by
directives to withhold lifesaving medical treatment, an act that like VSED is
expected to be fatal. Therefore, in articulating the fundamental reasons for
ADs’ normative force, I will have in mind directives to refuse lifesaving
care.
27

Bentley, 2015 BCCA at paras. 17, 18; Bentley, 2014 BCSC at 85-102, 114-120, 129152.
28
Some of the arguments of Cynthia Meier and Thuang Ong take this form. See Cynthia
A. Meier & Thuan D. Ong, To Feed or Not to Feed? A Case Report and Ethical Analysis
of Withholding Food and Drink in a Patient with Advanced Dementia, 50 J. PAIN &
SYMPTOM MGMT. 887, 888-89 (2015).
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1. Fundamental Reasons for Advance Dir ectives’ Nor mative Weight
I shall discuss three key reasons for thinking advance directives have
normative power.29 Together they address the difficult then-self/now-self
problem that ADs must face.30
a) Respect for Persons
One reason is the importance of previous competence and the fact that
even a current incompetent person is not a never-competent person.31
Ignoring a person’s AD amounts to treating her in exactly the same way we
would be treating her as if she had never been competent. But how can
doing that respect the person who the patient currently is, for even now, that
person is not a never-competent person.
b) Continuity of Self
A second reason pivots off the basic element of narrative identity.
Norman Cantor states it this way: “A person, by nurturing and developing a
body, character, and relationships has earned a prerogative to shape a life
narrative – including the medical fate of a succeeding incompetent
persona.”32 I refer to this as continuity of self across a life. The narrative by
and about oneself continues into incompetence. Mrs. Bentley, for example,
even in her most severe dementia, is still her daughter’s mother, and she is
still Mrs. Bentley. She undoubtedly would have said that she would still be
Mrs. Bentley, and Mother, if she had been asked about it when she was still
29

I articulate essentially similar reasons for advance directives in Paul T. Menzel,
Respect for Personal Autonomy in the Justification of Death Hastening Choices, in
EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE: GLOBAL VIEWS ON CHOOSING TO END LIFE 231,
239-44 (Michael Cholbi ed., 2017).
30
Supra section II, B, 3, b.
31
Rhoden, supra note 22, at 860.
32
Norman L. Cantor, Is It Immoral for Me to Dictate an Accelerated Death for My
Future Demented Self?, at 5 (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealthj/2015/12/02/is-it-immoral-for-me-to-dictate-anaccelerated-death-for-my-future-demented-self/.
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competent, and people now around her still assume that she is. A person’s
life narrative does not stop when she becomes severely demented.33
c) Self-Ownership
A third, closely related reason is self-ownership. One of the basic reasons
a competent person has the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment is
that such decisions are about his life, not about anyone else’s life, and
certainly not about no one’s life. That life is the life of the person with his
narrative history, a history that includes the AD he wrote. This sense of
ownership of the self by the self that has narrative continuity is so basic to
our notion of personhood that we rarely think about it. In being a person
with consciousness about our bodies, many of our thoughts, and our own
lives over time and into the future, we implicitly see the lives we have as
our lives. We readily use ADs to extend the right to refuse lifesaving
treatment deriving from self-ownership into the time of a person's
incompetence because the life at stake at that later time is still that person’s
life.
These three fundamental points about distinguishing previously
competent persons from never-competent persons, about continuity of
narrative self, and about self-ownership explain why ADs have moral and
legal force for medical treatment. That force is not limited to non-lifesaving
treatment—it can include even the most basic and common lifesaving
treatments, such as antibiotics for pneumonia.34

33

Menzel & Steinbock, supra note 21, at 488-89 (discussing in part various other
authors’ views of personal identity).
34
This is assumed to hold, of course, only if the directive is sufficiently clear: for
example, for what illnesses, in what conditions and with what prognoses for recovery,
etc., is the lifesaving treatment to be withheld?
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2. Application of These Reasons to Basic Per sonal Car e
Do these three fundamental reasons for ADs’ moral weight in the case of
lifesaving treatment apply also to basic personal care? In particular, do they
apply to oral feeding?
All three reasons do apply. In order to understand why, it is important to
note the context in which a directive to curtail oral feeding is likely to arise.
Any person who would write such a directive to withhold oral feeding upon
specified circumstances like severe dementia, for example, strongly desires
to control eating and drinking in those circumstances just as he or she
desires to control lifesaving medical treatment, for why else would the
person write such a directive? The prospect of living years into severe
dementia can be as daunting as enduring months of physical suffering at the
end of life. Those who would write a directive to curtail oral feeding are
intent on not having their lives extend into years of severe dementia. They
may be concerned about the effect on their loved ones, on how they
themselves will be remembered, or the disappointing shape of a whole life
that comes to a close in that unfortunate way. Their beliefs, values, and
attitudes on these scores are not incidental or shallow, and as they live into
their early- and mid-stage progressive dementia, these beliefs may be
among their most important convictions. For writers of ADs for SED, such
directives are a crucial part of how to accomplish their aim; they know they
may well not have the fortune of procuring an illness requiring lifesaving
care that can be refused pursuant to more conventional parts of their AD.
In this context, all three of the fundamental reasons for following
advance directives to refuse lifesaving treatment also apply to oral feeding.
Not treating a person as if she had never been competent is as important to
who the person still is—a previously competent person—as it is with
medical treatment. Continuity of narrative self is just as present, perhaps
even more so given the insistence the person conveys in her directive about
wanting not to live into years of severe dementia. And it is still her life that
is at stake as much as it ever is in a lifesaving treatment decision.
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
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An additional legal consideration is that for many “personal” matters,
“mental health directives” can be written for a variety of considerations
about dementia that go far beyond medical care—for example, financial
matters and interpersonal behavior such as sexual relations.35 The degree of
bodily intrusion involved in these matters and in oral feeding may be less
than in most medical care, but the right to refuse medical treatment is not
based solely on an intervention’s bodily intrusiveness (e.g., witness oral
medication).
3. What Car egiver Obligations Ar e Alter ed by Advance Dir ectives?
The question about caregiver obligations that needs to be addressed for
oral feeding is the same as the question for lifesaving treatment: what
normal obligations to provide care are altered by a clear advance directive?
With lifesaving treatment, the normal obligation of a caregiver in the
absence of a directive refusing care is to provide the treatment. Perhaps
when directives first came into prominence, caregivers resisted following a
directive to refuse ordinary basic lifesaving care. They rather quickly,
however, came to see that their normal obligations to provide care were
modified when an AD refusing such care was present. If someone’s
directive clearly says that certain lifesaving medical care is to be withheld,
not only are caregivers not obligated to provide it, they may even be
obligated not to provide it.
Why should caregivers’ obligations about oral feeding be altered any less
by ADs if the fundamental moral and legal reasons behind ADs’ moral and
legal force apply as much to life-extending oral feeding as they do to
35

Lisa Brodoff, Planning for Alzheimer’s Disease with Mental Health Advance
Directives, 17 ELDER L.J. 239, 281 (2010); Lisa Brodoff, Alzheimer’s Disease and
Dementia Mental Health Advance Directive, END OF LIFE WASHINGTON 7 (2015),
http://endoflifewa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/Alzheimers.Disease.and_.Dementia.Mental.Health.Advance.Dir
ective.10.2015.pdf.
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lifesaving treatment? Caregivers are indeed obligated to provide food,
water, and any necessary feeding assistance if no directive from the patient
says otherwise. But when there is a sufficiently clear directive, caregivers’
obligations to feed change, just as their obligations to provide lifesaving
treatment change when a directive enters the situation.
Critics may object because food, the most basic of necessities, is
involved. So too, though, is air a most basic necessity; when one cannot
breathe without a ventilator, a ventilator becomes a necessity. Yet we
respect a competent person’s decision to withhold or withdraw a ventilator.
Similarly, we respect a person’s competent decision to stop eating and
drinking, and if a competent patient needs physical feeding assistance, we
respect her decision to reject that assistance. If we extend a patient’s right to
refuse a ventilator to times of incompetence by a clear and applicable AD
despite the utter necessity of respiration, why would the utter necessity of
nutrition and hydration block us from extending the right to VSED to times
of incompetence by a clear and applicable AD? If no differences in actual
necessity provide the moral difference, why would the mere fact of food?
I conclude, then, that the difference between basic personal care and
medical treatment does not justify excluding oral feeding from the
legitimate scope of an AD.
4. Complicating Factor s That an AD for SED Should Addr ess
This conclusion does not mean that there are no other moral and legal
difficulties in SED by AD. Complicating factors are likely to make writing
and implementing such directives more challenging than directives to
withhold most medical treatments. A good AD for SED needs not only to
state clearly the circumstances in which oral feeding is to be stopped. It will
also need to address other issues that may arise for one’s caregivers.
One issue occurs if and when the incapacitated person wants to eat. In the
most advanced stages of progressive dementia, a person may not express
any desire to eat when food is withheld, but in somewhat earlier stages, still
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severe, desire for food may be expressed by a grimace, gesture, or sound of
apparent need. Unless oral feeding runs a significant risk of aspiration with
all of its attendant distress and risk of infection, an expression of desire to
eat creates a conflict between the directive and the person’s current
experience-based interest in eating and surviving. In the overall picture, as a
previously competent person with a strongly stated AD, she has a larger
shape-of-her-life interest in not being kept alive with continued feeding. 36
However, the tension between that larger interest and the current apparent
desire to eat makes it understandably difficult for caregivers to withhold
food.
ADs should address these kinds of prospective situations. Otherwise
caregivers will be left not knowing whether the person meant to proceed
with withholding oral feeding in this kind of situation. In the AD, one might
stipulate, for example, that in such a circumstance feeding should still be
stopped, but with coordinated use of distress-relieving and appetitesuppressing drugs. The directive might also include a reminder that most
deaths by SED can be made peaceful and comfortable by appropriate mouth
care for the discomfort of dehydration and by the employment of any antidelirium drugs that may be called for.37 If the directive addresses such
considerations, it will speak directly to later caregivers and their
obligations. Caregivers will more readily see that their normal obligations
concerning food and fluids are altered by a person’s AD.38
36

See generally Ronald Dworkin, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 200-32 (1993). The notion of “critical
interests” is analyzed and applied to situations of persons in severe dementia by Menzel
& Chandler-Cramer, supra note 1, at 27-28; Menzel & Steinbock, supra note 21, at 48996.
37
It should not be necessary to mention such particular ameliorative measures in a
directive, for they are simply good palliative care that should be available in any dying by
SED. Palliative care, however, does not always get the attention it deserves, and many
providers may not be sufficiently familiar with VSED and death from lack of food and
fluids to know the important role that palliative care can play in it.
38
These are not the only important elements of a good directive for SED. Additional
ones are detailed in Menzel & Chandler-Cramer, supra note 1, at 34-35.
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A second issue that a complete AD for SED will address is the continuum
between simply offering adequately prepared food and providing sustained
manual feeding assistance. The directive should be reasonably specific
where on this continuum oral feeding should stop. If the person wants
persistent manual assistance with feeding to be withheld, though not the
mere offering of prepared food, then she should state that clearly in her AD.
If this matter is not spoken to in the directive, caregivers will be left
hanging without knowing just what the directive means.39
The more clearly the AD addresses these issues and the more explicitly
they are discussed with a person’s designated representatives when the
person is still competent, the more persuasive the directive can be to loved
ones and caregivers. Proceeding to withhold oral feeding is a very difficult
decision for representatives and caregivers even when it is justified by a
strong directive. The person writing the directive should do what is possible
to ease the burden of these difficult decisions on loved ones and caregivers.

III. CONCLUSION
VSED is a legal option in the United States for hastening one’s death.40 It
is not restricted by the eligibility limits such as terminal illness (six-monthprognosis) that have characterized physician aid-in-dying in the US
jurisdictions where aid-in-dying has been legalized. In this respect, VSED is
the first legally realistic option for people who want not to have their lives
extend into years of chronic disease such as progressive dementia. VSED,
39
For empirical studies and discussion of physicians’ and family members’ views on
how to regard a current desire to eat in relation to the person’s directive to withhold food
and fluids by mouth and where on the continuum from making food available to
providing manual assistance in ingesting it, see generally Ladislav Volicer & Karen Stets,
Acceptability of an Advance Directive That Limits Food and Liquids in Advanced
Dementia, 33 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 55 (2016); Ladislav Volicer, Fear of
Dementia, 17 J. AM. MED. DIRECTORS ASS’N 875 (2016). Volicer’s and Stets’ findings
are more complex than can be summarized here, though generally they point to a notable
openness of many providers and family members to cease oral feeding for someone in
severe dementia with a pertinent AD.
40
Pope & Anderson, supra note 3; Cantor, supra note 3.
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however, requires that a person be decisive and have a mental capacity that
is no longer likely to be present in late to moderate dementia patients and
disappears completely in severe dementia. To be sure, “pre-emptive
VSED,” performed when a person is still competent and decisive, remains a
legal option by which one can avoid eventual prolonged deterioration, but
that option will usually involve the sacrifice of valuable time in life between
the time of action and the stage of debilitation that the person wants to
avoid. SED by AD is the only remaining option that has an existing legal
basis.41
To become a truly viable legal option, however, SED by AD will need to
overcome numerous objections. The three considered in this paper may
seem too many to be definitive ethical and legal barriers to implementing
any AD for SED. Careful moral and legal analysis, however, does not
support these objections. The objection that consent is no defense to
criminal homicide does not even arise if an AD has already altered the
obligation of a caregiver to provide food and fluids. Mere willingness of the
incompetent person to eat will not typically constitute a change of mind
about the directive to withhold oral feeding. And the fact that oral feeding is
basic personal care does not put it outside the scope of a directive’s
normative power because the fundamental reasons that ADs have any
normative power at all apply as much to persons’ desire to have food and
fluids withheld as they do to their desire to have prospective lifesaving
treatment withheld. Caregivers’ obligations for oral feeding should be as
amenable to alteration by AD as are their obligations to provide basic
lifesaving medical care.
This conclusion emerges from moral and legal reasoning; it is not a claim
based on actual judicial rulings, which on this issue (at least in the United
States) barely exist. Cultural and institutional barriers will also make the
path to persuading caregivers that they are permitted to implement ADs for
41

Cantor, BILL OF HEALTH, supra note 4.
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SED less than smooth.42 Arguably, however, it is likely that VSED itself
will become more accepted, in part because it increasingly and dependably
gets accompanied by good palliative care; that the incidence and toll of
extended years in severe dementia will grow, as will the determination not
to live long into such years; and that ADs for SED will increasingly get
written with the clarity needed to speak to the real difficulties
representatives and caregivers often experience in sensing their obligations
about oral feeding. Then implementing ADs for SED may become
increasingly feasible. The three objections discussed at length in this paper
should not stand in the way.
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